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Abstract
We study the impact of mandatory calorie posting on consumers’ purchase decisions, using detailed
data from Starbucks. We ﬁnd that average calories per transaction falls by 6%. The eﬀect is almost
entirely related to changes in consumers’ food choices—there is almost no change in purchases of beverage
calories. There is no impact on Starbucks proﬁt on average, and for the subset of stores located close to
their competitor Dunkin Donuts, the eﬀect of calorie posting is actually to increase Starbucks revenue.
Survey evidence and analysis of commuters suggest the mechanism for the eﬀect is a combination of
learning and salience.
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feedback.1 Introduction
Between 1995 and 2008 the fraction of Americans who were obese rose from 15.9% to 26.6%, and
according to the OECD the United States is the most obese nation in the world.1 Researchers
have debated the causes of the dramatic rise in obesity, often referred to as an epidemic, and
economists have debated whether it is a public or private concern.2 Regardless, there is rising
interest in potential policy interventions, including prohibitions on vending machines in schools,
taxation of certain foods, and regulation of fast-food restaurants.3 One policy has recently
emerged with great momentum: mandatory posting of calories on menus in chain restaurants.
The law was ﬁrst implemented in New York City (NYC) in mid-2008. Numerous other states
have subsequently enacted similar laws and federal legislation is before Congress.4
In this study we measure the eﬀect of the NYC law on consumers’ caloric purchases, and
analyze the mechanism underlying the eﬀect. On the one hand it may seem obvious that
increasing the provision of nutrition information to consumers would help them to purchase
healthier food. Indeed, the common presumption is that consumers will be surprised to learn
how many calories are in the beverage and food items oﬀered at chain restaurants. On the
other hand, consumers at chain restaurants (especially fast food chains) may care mostly about
convenience, price, and taste, with calories being relatively unimportant. Consumers who do
care about calories may already be well-informed, since calorie information is already widely
available on in-store posters and brochures, on placemats and packaging, and on company web
sites. Even for consumers who are not well-informed, the direction of the policy’s eﬀect depends
on the direction of the surprise: while some consumers may learn that they were underestimating
the calorie content of their favorite menu items, others may learn that they were overestimating—
so the direction of the average response is a priori unclear.
Ultimately, the impact of the policy must be gauged by observing consumers’ actual purchase
behavior. To this end, we persuaded Starbucks to provide us with detailed transaction data.
There are three key components to the dataset we analyze. First, we observe every transaction at
Starbucks company stores in NYC from January 1, 2008, to February 28, 2009, with mandatory
calorie posting commencing on April 1, 2008. To control for other factors aﬀecting transactions,
we also observe every transaction at Starbucks company stores in Boston and Philadelphia,
1Based on data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Obesity is deﬁned as BMI≥30.0.
BMI refers to body mass index, deﬁned as weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) squared. For
international comparisons see OECD (2009).
2See Bhattacharya (2008), Bleich et al (2007), Philipson and Posner (2008), and the papers cited therein.
3See Mello, Studdert and Brennan (2006).
4The health reform bill passed by the House in November 2009 includes mandatory calorie posting for chain
restaurants (America’s Aﬀordable Health Choices Act of 2009, Section 2562).
1where there was no calorie posting. The second component is a large sample of anonymous
Starbucks cardholders (inside and outside of NYC) that we track over the same period of time,
allowing us to examine the impact of calorie posting at the individual level. The third component
we analyze is a set of in-store customer surveys we performed before and after the introduction
of a calorie posting law in Seattle on January 1, 2009. These surveys provide evidence about
how knowledgeable people were about calories at Starbucks before and after the law change.
We also surveyed consumers at the same points in time in control locations where there was no
calorie posting.
We ﬁnd that mandatory calorie posting does inﬂuence consumer behavior at Starbucks, caus-
ing average calories per transaction to decrease by 6% (from 247 to 232 calories per transaction).
The eﬀects are long lasting: the calorie reduction in NYC persists for the entire period of our
data, which extends 10 months after the calorie posting commenced. Almost all of the eﬀect
is related to food purchases—average beverage calories per transaction did not substantially
change, while average food calories per transaction fell by 14% (equal to 14 calories per transac-
tion on average). Three quarters (10 calories) of the reduction in calories per transaction is due
to consumers buying fewer items, and one quarter (4 calories) of the eﬀect is due to consumers
substituting towards lower calorie items.
The potential impact of calorie posting on restaurants’ proﬁts is an important aspect of the
policy’s overall eﬀect. The data in this study provide a unique opportunity to directly assess
the impact of calorie posting on Starbucks revenue (which is highly correlated with their proﬁt
under plausible assumptions). We ﬁnd that calorie posting did not cause any statistically sig-
niﬁcant change in Starbucks revenue overall. Interestingly, we estimate that revenue actually
increased by 3% at Starbucks stores located within 100 meters of a Dunkin Donuts (an impor-
tant competitor to Starbucks in NYC). Hence, there is evidence that calorie posting may have
caused some consumers to substitute away from Dunkin Donuts toward Starbucks. The fact
that Starbucks’ proﬁtability is unaﬀected by calorie posting is consistent with the ﬁnding that
consumers’ beverage choices are unchanged, which is of course Starbucks’ core business.
The competitive eﬀect of calorie posting highlights the distinction between mandatory vs.
voluntary posting. It is important to note that our analysis concerns a policy in which all
chain restaurants, not just Starbucks, are required to post calorie information on their menus.
Voluntary posting by a single chain would result in substantively diﬀerent outcomes, especially
with respect to competitive eﬀects.5
5The potential for information unravelling, in which all ﬁrms choose to voluntarily disclose calorie information,
is discussed in Section 5.
2By associating local demographics with store locations, we estimate the eﬀect of calorie
posting is increasing in income and education. The anonymous cardholder data is particularly
well-suited to analyzing heterogeneity in consumers’ responsiveness to calorie posting. We ﬁnd
that individuals who averaged more than 250 calories per transaction prior to calorie posting
reacted to calorie posting by decreasing calories per transaction by 26%—dramatically more
than the 6% average reduction for all consumers.
The cardholder data and the survey data also allow us to explore the mechanism underlying
consumers’ reaction to the information. Calorie posting may aﬀect consumer choice because it
improves their knowledge of calories (a learning eﬀect) and/or because it increases their sensi-
tivity to calories (a salience eﬀect). In our surveys, consumers report placing more importance
on calories in their purchase decisions after having been exposed to calorie posting, which is sug-
gestive of a salience eﬀect. However, when we analyze the transactions of cardholders who make
regular purchases both in and out of NYC (i.e., commuters), we ﬁnd that exposure to calorie
information aﬀects their choices even at non-posting (i.e. non-NYC) stores, which is consistent
with a learning eﬀect but inconsistent with the salience eﬀect.
Mandatory calorie-posting laws have been controversial, with strong opposition from some
chains and restaurant associations. Ultimately, whether calorie posting aﬀects people’s behavior
is an empirical question. The detailed transaction data we use in this study are uniquely well-
suited to answering this question. However, there are two important limitations to this research.
First, we do not directly measure the eﬀect of calorie posting on obesity itself. Current lags
in the availability of BMI data from the CDC suggest this will not be addressable for a couple
more years. For now, we can only use evidence from the medical literature to provide a crude
estimate of the change in body weight that would result from the calorie reductions we ﬁnd at
Starbucks (see Section 5.2).
A second limitation is that we have data for only one chain (Starbucks). We cannot know if
the eﬀects of mandatory calorie posting at Starbucks are similar to the eﬀects at other chains.
We also do not know if people oﬀset changes in their calorie consumption at Starbucks by
changing what they eat at home, say. While these shortcomings must be acknowledged, the
advantage of our data is that we have a remarkably complete picture of the eﬀects of the calorie
posting at Starbucks—it is diﬃcult to imagine having such detailed data for other chains, let
alone for a large cross-section of them. Moreover, Starbucks is an especially important testing
ground by virtue of its large size. Starbucks’ revenue in 2008 was over $10 billion, with around
11,000 stores in the U.S.6 Only one other chain restaurant had more than $10 billion in annual
6The total North-American movie exhibition box-oﬃce (at $9.8 billion in 2008) was less than Starbuck’s
3revenues in 2008: McDonalds.7
2 Background
The mandatory calorie posting law in NYC requires all chains (with 15 or more units nationwide)
to display calories for every item on all menu boards and menus in a font and format that is at
least as prominent as price. Figure 1 shows an example of a Starbucks menu board with calorie
information. Health department inspectors verify the posting, and restaurants may be ﬁned up
to $2,000 for non-compliance. The NYC Board of Health ﬁrst voted in the law in 2006, but
legal challenges from the New York State Restaurant Association delayed its implementation
until mid-2008.8 The litigation process gave restaurants a couple of years to anticipate the
introduction of the new law and created uncertainty around the date at which enforcement
would commence. In early May, 2008, it was reported that restaurants in NYC were being given
citations for non-compliance; however, ﬁnes were not imposed until late July, 2008. Starbucks
commenced calorie posting in their NYC stores on April 1, 2008. They were one of the ﬁrst
chains to start posting and, as best we can tell, other chains were close behind.
The principal argument made by opponents of mandatory calorie posting is that the in-
formation is already available (on in-store posters and brochures, wrappers, tray liners, and
on the internet).9 Indeed, Starbucks also provided calorie information via in-store brochures
and online before the new law in NYC. However, the NYC health department has emphasized
the importance of making calorie information available at the point of purchase.10 Another
natural argument against calorie posting is that forcing restaurants to put the information on
menus is costly. One news report indicated the cost of compliance for the Wendy’s chain was
about $2,000 per store.11 However, the law may have generated some additional indirect costs
for chains, such as costs associated with having diﬀerent menus for diﬀerent cities (increasing
delays in the process of introducing new products).
revenue.
7According to QSR Magazine (a leading industry publication).
8Farley, et al (2009) provides a detailed review of the challenges faced by the NYC Health Department in
implementing the calorie posting requirement.
9See Berman and Lavizzo-Mourey (2008) for a review of the arguments for and against calorie posting.
10In support of this view, Roberto, Agnew, and Brownell (2009) observe patrons in fast-food restaurants that
provide brochures or posters with calorie information (calories are not posted on menus), ﬁnding that only 0.1%
of consumers are attentive to the information.
11Chicago Tribune, May 11, 2008.
42.1 Data Summary
Our transaction data cover all 222 Starbucks locations in NYC, and all 94 Starbucks locations
in Boston and Philadelphia.12 At each location we observe all transactions for a period of time 3
months before and 11 months after calorie posting commenced (i.e. January 1, 2008, to February
28, 2009). There are over 100 million transactions in the dataset.13 For each transaction we
observe the time and date, store location, items purchased and price of each item. Using
Starbucks nutritional information we can also calculate the calories in each purchase.
In addition to the transaction data we have data for a sample of anonymous Starbucks
cardholders, tracking their purchases over the same period of time all over the U.S. There are
2.7 million anonymous individuals in this dataset, but most do not make purchases in NYC. We
deﬁne a sub-sample containing any individual that averaged at least one transaction per week
in one of NYC, Boston or Philadelphia, in the period before calorie posting in NYC. There are
7,520 such individuals in NYC and 3,772 such individuals in Boston and Philadelphia, generating
a combined 1.51 million transactions for us to study.
We refer to the ﬁrst dataset as the transaction data and the second dataset as the cardholder
data. The advantage of the cardholder data is that we can assess how the calorie information
causes particular individuals to change behavior. However, these cardholders may not be rep-
resentative of Starbucks customers more generally, as we expect these individuals are above
average in their loyalty to Starbucks. The transaction data, on the other hand, cover the uni-
verse of transactions. In the analysis we compare the separately estimated eﬀects of calorie
posting on the cardholder data with transaction data.
Table 1 provides an array of summary statistics for transactions. To preserve conﬁdentialty
of competitively sensitive information, for both datasets we normalize the value for NYC to one.
This allows us to show diﬀerences across regions for each dataset without revealing the levels.
Due to the very large number of observations, any diﬀerences tend to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Qualitatively, however, it appears that Boston and Phildelphia are reasonable controls for NYC.
An important variable of interest is calories per transaction. Based on the transaction data,
12These data cover all Starbucks company owned stores. Starbucks products are also sold in a small number
of independently owned locations for which we do not have any data. The fraction of excluded transactions is
unknown, but we believe it to be well-under 5%.
13We exclude transactions at stores that were not open during the entire data period (i.e. we analyze the
balanced panel), and we exclude transactions that included more than four units of any one item because we
consider these purchases to be driven by fundamentally diﬀerent processes (bulk purchases for an oﬃce, say). The
excluded transactions represent only 2.2% of all transactions.
5we compute that, prior to calorie posting, in NYC: (i) average drink calories per transaction
was 143; (ii) average food calories per transaction was 104; and (iii) average total calories
per transaction was 247. Consumers frequently add milk to their beverages at the self-service
counter, which is a source of additional calories. Neither the transaction data or cardholder
data provide any information about this behavior.14 However, we also obtained Starbucks milk
order data for all stores in NYC, Boston and Philadelphia, which reveal the quantity of regular,
skim, and non-fat milk that is replenished each day in each location. This allows us to assess
the impact of calorie posting on aggregate and proportional consumption of each kind of milk
in Starbucks. Based on this dataset, customers in NYC, Boston and Philadelphia consume .04
gallons of milk per transaction (on average).
Each Starbucks location oﬀers more than a thousand beverage and food products (deﬁned by
SKUs), all varying in caloric content. Notably, brewed coﬀee (their staple product) is very low
in calories (5 calories). The highest calorie beverage sold by Starbucks is the 24 oz. Hazelnut
Signature Hot Chocolate with whipped cream, at 860 calories. Food items sold at Starbucks
vary between roughly 100 calories (small cookies) and 500 calories (some muﬃns).
How much variation is there in prices and product oﬀerings? Prices at Starbucks vary across
regions but not within cities. For example, a latte is the same price in Manhattan as in Staten
Island, but has a diﬀerent price in Boston. Within regions, there is no price variation over
time within the 14 month period of our data. Beverage oﬀerings are the same in all Starbucks
and there is some variation in food items. The only signiﬁcant change to product oﬀerings
that took place during the period of our data was the introduction in August 2008 of the
Vivanno smoothies, which are low calorie alternatives to a frappuccino. These were introduced
nationwide, and were unrelated to calorie posting in NYC. We discuss the topic of changing
product oﬀerings in more detail in Section 5.
Seattle was the next city after NYC to introduce a calorie posting law. Seattle’s law came
into eﬀect on January 1, 2009. In anticipation of the law change, we performed in-store customer
surveys on December 5, 2008 at two locations in Seattle and two locations in San Francisco (as
controls). We repeated the surveys at the same four locations on January 30, 2009, after the
law came into eﬀect. The questionnaire is shown in the appendix. The key questions concern
consumers’ knowledge of calories, providing direct evidence about how well informed consumers
were in the absence of posting, and to what degree posting of calories aﬀected their knowledge.
We defer a more detailed summary of these data until Section 5. Finally, we also have transaction
14In the transaction data we do observe beverages ordered with soy milk since these beverage are assigned a
diﬀerent SKU and price. If a consumer asks for whipped cream to be added to their beverage we also observe
this in the transaction data because there is an additional charge.
6data for Seattle and control cities (Portland and San Francisco) over the same period time as
NYC. As we explain below, the law change in Seattle diﬀers from NYC, preventing us from
replicating the analysis of the law change in NYC.
2.2 Related Research
The notion that increasing the provision of nutrition information may stimulate people to adopt
healthier eating habits is an old idea, and numerous prior studies have sought to evaluate
its merit. An early study by Jacoby, Chestnut and Silberman (1977) presents evidence that
consumers tend not to seek out nutrition information or to understand it, despite claiming they
would be willing to pay for more nutrition information. Hence, an important theme in this line
of research has been the importance of how information is presented—designing programs that
make information easy to access and understand.15 Many of the studies on this topic rely on
survey responses. However, several studies examine the eﬀect of nutrition information on actual
sales, including Ippolito and Mathios (1990), Ippolito and Mathios (1995), Kiesel and Villas-
Boas (2008) and Mathios (2000).16 All of these papers ﬁnd evidence that demand is sensitive
to nutrition information. Finally, Variyam and Cawley (2006) analyze the question of whether
nutrition labeling causes reduced obesity, ﬁnding that it does.17
The above-mentioned papers all focus on nutrition labeling of packaged foods. However,
the calorie posting requirement that we study applies to restaurant meals, and in particular to
chains that are largely fast-food restaurants. Indeed, a popular view seems to be that fast-food
restaurants are important contributors to the rise in obesity. Several studies have sought to
test this hypothesis, including two recent papers: Anderson and Matsa (2007) and Currie et
al (2009).18 Neither paper ﬁnds that fast food restaurants have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on obesity
in general; however, Currie et al (2009) ﬁnd that teenagers whose schools are located within
0.1 miles of a fast food chain have signiﬁcantly higher obesity rates.
A few prior studies also analyze mandatory calorie posting at chain restaurants in NYC.
In one study prior to calorie posting (in 2007), researchers from the NYC health department
surveyed chain patrons in NYC to assess the potential impact of calorie posting (Bassett et
al, 2008). Important for their study was the fact that Subway restaurants had already chosen to
15See Andrews, Netemeyer and Burton (1998), Balasubramanian and Cole (2002), Jacoby (1974), Muller (1985),
Phillips and Zeckhauser (1996) and Russo et al (1986).
16Grunert and Wills (2007) provide a detailed survey of recent related research.
17McGeary (2009) ﬁnds that state-level nutrition-education funding also causes a reduction in obesity.
18See also the study of fast-food advertising by Chou, Rashad and Grossman (2008).
7post calorie information. They found that 32% of survey respondents at Subway reported seeing
calorie information, compared to 4% of respondents at other chains where calorie information
was only available via brochures or posters. Furthermore, the Subway respondents that reported
seeing calorie information purchased 52 fewer calories, on average, than the Subway respondents
who did not.
Two subsequent papers compare purchase data before and after calorie posting in NYC.
Downs et al (2009) collected a total of 1,354 receipts from patrons at two burger restaurants and
one coﬀee shop (all unnamed) before and after calorie posting. There are no control locations
where calories were never posted in their study. Large standard errors prevent the authors from
drawing clear conclusions, but they argue there is some evidence of responsiveness to calorie
posting.
A second study by Elbel et al (2009) also utilizes receipts collected from patrons outside of
chain restaurants, before and after calorie posting in NYC. The data cover 14 restaurants in
NYC and ﬁve control restaurants in Newark, New Jersey (there was no posting in New Jersey).
All restaurants are located in low-income neighborhoods, and the sample covers McDonald’s,
Burger King, Wendy’s and KFC.19 The pre-period data were collected over a two week period
beginning on July 8, 2008.20 The post-period data were collected approximately four weeks later.
Their dataset comprises a total of 1,156 receipts. As in Downs et al (2009), large standard errors
lead to the conclusion that calorie posting had no statistically signiﬁcant impact on calories per
transaction.21
Since our study is not the ﬁrst to examine the impact of the NYC calorie posting law, it
is important that we clarify how our approach diﬀers from the prior research. In comparison,
the dataset we study is much larger and broader—the universe of over 100 million transactions
at Starbucks in Boston, NYC and Philadelphia, over a 14 month period. We also analyze
individual-level data (1.5 million transactions of anonymous customers over time), as well as
a survey that focuses on testing consumers’ knowledge of calories (the prior studies did not
test consumers’ knowledge). In common with the prior research, we address the fundamental
question of whether calorie posting aﬀects calories per transaction. However, it is conceivable
the policy change would have only a short-run eﬀect, while news coverage heightens awareness.
19We actually ﬁnd that the eﬀects of calorie posting are greater in high income and high education neighborhoods
(see below).
20The timing of their pre-period sample collection is questionable, since Starbucks began posting on April 1,
2008. Also, the New York Times reported on April 22, 2008, that a number of chains were already posting calories
as they had expected the law to have already come into eﬀect.
21Wisdom, Downs and Loewenstein (2010) experiment with the provision of calorie information to restau-
rant consumers, although not in the form of calorie posting on menu boards. See also Colby, et al (2009) and
Gerend (2009).
8We examine the time-path and longevity of the eﬀect, for up to 11 months after calorie posting.
Furthermore, we analyze the impact on product substitution patterns—switching to smaller
sizes, lower calorie items, fewer items, or less frequent purchases. We also examine heterogeneity
in consumers’ responsiveness to calorie posting. Lastly, the data we study provides a unique
opportunity to analyze the impact of calorie posting on restaurants’ proﬁts.
3 Eﬀect of Mandatory Calorie Posting on Calorie Consumption
3.1 Calories Per Transaction
The basic impact of mandatory calorie posting on calorie consumption is evident without any
regression analysis (no controls of any kind). Based on the transaction data (and using only
transactions with at least one beverage or food item), Figure 2 shows average calories per
transaction each week, distinguishing transactions in NYC from transactions in the control
cities.22 The top panel shows calories from beverages (both hot and cold), and the bottom
panel shows calories from food items. The vertical line at April 1, 2008 corresponds to the
introduction of calorie posting on Starbucks menu boards in NYC. The ﬁgure for beverages does
not reveal a clear impact, although some eﬀect becomes apparent around October, 2008.23 In
contrast, the pattern for food calories is striking—prior to calorie posting, average food calories
per transaction was consistently higher in NYC than in Boston and Philadelphia, and this is
clearly reversed following calorie posting.
Table 2 provides another basic perspective on how beverage choices are seemingly unaﬀected
by calorie posting. This table, based on the cardholder data, documents changes in individuals’
most common beverage choices following calorie posting. Similar to a regression with individual
ﬁxed eﬀects, the table summarizes within-individual changes in purchase behavior. Each cell in
the table reports two percentages: one for cardholders in NYC and another for cardholders in
Boston and Philadelphia. So, for example, 2.3% of cardholders in NYC switched from whatever
was their most commonly purchased beverage to a drink that was both smaller in size and lower
in calories per ounce. The same number for Boston and Philadelphia is 1.9%. On the one hand,
the table shows that 8.4% of cardholders in NYC switched to a smaller size drink and 11.6%
switched to a drink with lower calories per ounce. On the other hand, the table also shows
that 10.4% switched to a larger drink size and 12.2% switched to a higher calorie per ounce
22All the analysis in this section utilizes the subset of transactions with at least one beverage or food item. We
exclude transactions for items such as newspapers. Elsewhere in the paper we examine all transactions.
23Note the spiking in late 2008 relates to Thanksgiving and the Christmas-New Years period.
9drink. Moreover, we ﬁnd almost identical patterns in the control cities, suggesting the changes
are unrelated to calorie posting (and more likely due to seasonality). The table also highlights
the high degree of similarity between our samples of cardholders in NYC and the control cities.
To examine the eﬀects of calorie posting while controlling for seasonality and other inﬂuences,
we estimate regressions of the following form:
yst = xstβ + γPOSTst + st, (1)
where where yst is a measure of calories per transaction, POSTst is a dummy equal to one if
calories were posted at store s on day t (i.e., NYC stores after April 1, 2008), and xst includes
week ﬁxed eﬀects (to control for seasonality), day-of-week dummies, holiday dummies, tem-
perature and temperature squared, and precipitation and precipitation squared. We estimate
versions of this speciﬁcation separately with the transaction data and the cardholder data. With
the transaction data we aggregate transactions to the store-day level, because estimation at the
transaction level (with over 100 million observations) is too burdensome. In this case we also
include store ﬁxed eﬀects to control for all time-invariant, store-speciﬁc heterogeneity. Hence,
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of calorie posting stems from within-store variation over time. When
we estimate the above model using the cardholder data we include individual consumer ﬁxed
eﬀects (and drop the store ﬁxed eﬀects). In this case identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of calorie posting
comes from within-individual variation over time.
Table 3 reports the estimated eﬀects of calorie posting on calorie consumption (estimates of
γ) from six separate regressions.24 In the top row the dependent variable is log(beverage calories
per transaction).25 Based on the transaction data, we estimate that calorie posting caused a
trivial decrease in beverage calories per transaction of 0.3%. In the second row the dependent
variable is log(food calories per transaction). Based on the transaction data we estimate that
food calories decreased by 13.7% (based on the estimate of -0.147). In the bottom row we report
the estimated impact on log(beverage + food calories), ﬁnding a 5.8% decrease in average calories
per transaction, equivalent to 14.4 calories.26
The estimates based on the cardholder data are reported in the second column of Table 3.
The estimated eﬀect on beverage calories is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The estimate for
24All but one of the estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. The exception is the estimated
eﬀect on beverage calories based on the cardholder data.
25We repeated the analysis using absolute calories as the dependent variable and ﬁnd almost identical results.
26To address any concern over serial correlation, we aggregate all transaction data before calorie posting,
and all transaction data after calorie posting, then test the diﬀerence between average calories per transaction
before versus after. Based on this conservative approach to controlling for serial correlation, we continue to
ﬁnd approximately the same eﬀect of calorie posting on calories per transaction, and the diﬀerence in means is
signiﬁcant with more 99% conﬁdence.
10food calories per transaction is a 11.2% decrease (based on the coeﬃcient estimate of -0.119).
The estimate for the eﬀect on average total calories using the cardholder data is 5.0% lower
calories. Since the regressions from the two datasets rely on diﬀerent sources of identiﬁcation,
the similarity of the estimated eﬀects strengthens our conclusions. In Section 5 we discuss the
magnitude of these estimates and their potential implications for obesity.
We also estimate the impact of calorie posting on the total number of calories sold by
Starbucks each day. This approach combines the eﬀect of a change in average calories per
transaction with a change in the number of transactions per day (which we analyze separately,
below). Although not shown in a table, we ﬁnd that calorie posting causes a 4.6% decrease
in average calories per store-day.27 Since this eﬀect is less than the estimated reduction in
calories per transaction, this obviously reﬂects the fact that Starbucks experienced an increase
in transactions due to calorie posting, as shown below.
The results shown in Table 3 are based on speciﬁcations in which calorie posting is binary—
i.e., the POST variable is simply a dummy equal to one at NYC stores on every day after
April 1, 2008. An alternative approach is to estimate separate week dummies for NYC and the
control cities.28 This allows the data to ﬂexibly show whether the timing of the decrease in
calories per transaction corresponds to the posting date, and whether the eﬀect diminishes over
time. Figure 3 plots the estimated weekly ﬁxed eﬀects for NYC from this speciﬁcation using the
transaction data, where the dependent variable is log(average calories per transaction) at store
s on day t. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that the drop in calories per transaction occurred right around
April 1, 2008, and persisted through February 2009, with only a diminution of the eﬀect over
the winter holidays.
The above estimates rely on the suitability of Boston and Philadelphia as controls for NYC.
One potential concern is that other shocks (besides calorie posting) may have aﬀected NYC
diﬀerently than the control cities. For example, the inﬂux of tourists in the summer is probably
larger for NYC than the controls. However, there are a few reasons why other factors are
unlikely to confound our ﬁndings. First, the time path of estimates shown in Figure 3 indicates
the reduction in calories occurred immediately following calorie posting on April 1, 2008. Hence,
any other diﬀerential change in NYC relative to the controls that could explain this pattern must
have occurred at almost the same time. That seems unlikely. Second, the estimated eﬀect of
27The estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 99% conﬁdence. The regression includes the same
controls as in the above analysis of calories per transaction.
28In this case the control cities are no longer “controls” in the usual sense, since we do not rely on this information
to control for other time-varying factors that impact caloric purchases in NYC. The data from the control cities
still contributes to the estimation of the coeﬃcients on weather and day-of-week dummies.
11calorie posting based on the cardholder data is primarily identiﬁed by within-individual variation
over time. Tourism, for example, plays no role in this case. Note also that we obtain similar
estimates of the eﬀect of calorie posting using both the transaction data and cardholder data.
Third, with the transaction data we can separately estimate the eﬀect of calorie posting in
each borough. Using regressions analogous to those reported in Table 3, we ﬁnd that calorie
reductions in Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and the Bronx are all comparable to the reduction
in Manhattan.29 Since tourism in NYC is heavily concentrated in Manhattan, we would have
found negligible eﬀects in the other boroughs if tourism were the underlying source of the calorie
reductions.
Finally, as noted in Section 2, Seattle implemented a mandatory calorie posting law on
January 1, 2009. As mentioned brieﬂy above, we also obtained transaction data for Seattle, as
well as control cities (Portland and San Francisco), over the same period of time. Hence, we
have two months of transaction data for the post-law period in Seattle. But the law in Seattle
diﬀered from NYC in one critical way: the pastry case was exempt. Hence, while beverages
had calories posted on the menu boards, almost all food items sold in Starbucks in Seattle did
not have posted calories. Regression analysis of the transaction data for Seattle (and controls)
shows: (i) drink calories per transaction fell by 4.6 calories (standard error of 0.3); (ii) food
calories per transaction increased by 0.8 calories (standard error of 0.2). Hence, in Seattle we
see a small decrease in beverage calories and a negligible impact on food calories. The small
estimated impact on beverage choices accords well with our results for NYC, and the absence
of any meaningful change in food calories makes sense given that food calories were not posted
in Seattle.
3.2 Substitution Eﬀects
We expect that calorie posting may have caused substitution away from relatively high calorie
beverage and food items (either to other products or to nothing). To quantify the impact on
product-level sales, we regress log daily sales on an indicator for calorie posting, plus store,
week, and day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects, holiday dummies and weather controls, with the regressions
estimated separately for each menu item.30 Transactions for the control cities are included to
control for seasonal variation in product demand. Rather than report all of the estimated eﬀects,
Figure 4 instead plots the estimated sales changes (as a function of normalized calories) for the
29We estimate reductions of 6.2%, 10.0%, 4.7%, 5.6%, and 4.9% for Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and
Staten Island, respectively.
30We aggregate across diﬀerent sizes of each beverage.
1260 most popular menu items.31 Although the sales changes display a slight negative correlation
with calories (as indicated by the ﬁtted regression line), the estimated eﬀects are highly variable
and do not demonstrate a statistically signiﬁcant pattern of high calorie items losing market
share.
While these sales changes may seem diﬃcult to interpret, we should not expect products’
market shares to move in a way that is perfectly correlated with their calorie content. In prin-
ciple, consumer responses should be driven by how much they are surprised by the information,
rather than simply by the level of calories. For instance, a 16 oz vanilla latte has a relatively high
250 calories, and we estimate calorie posting causes a small relative increase in its sales—which
seems counter-intuitive. But consumers may have previously believed a vanilla latte had even
higher calories, and were thus surprised to learn it had only 250. Indeed, the survey evidence
we analyze in Section 5.1 shows that consumers tend to overestimate the calories in beverages.
Reductions in calories per transaction occur because consumers substitute to lower calorie
items (smaller sizes, diﬀerent drinks or food items) and/or purchase fewer items. To examine
the relative importance of these two eﬀects, we again estimate versions of equation (1) with
number of items per transaction and log(calories per item purchased) as the dependent variables
(separately for beverages and food).32 The estimates are reported in Table 4. As in Table 3, each
estimate in the table is based on a separate regression, and we again utilize both the transaction
data and the cardholder data. Based on both datasets we estimate that the number of beverages
per transaction barely changes. We estimate that the number of food items per transaction fell
by .029 or .022 with the transactions data and cardholder data, respectively.33
To assess substitution to lower calorie options, we estimate the impact on beverage calories
per beverage purchased (conditional on purchasing at least one beverage), and the impact on
food calories per food item purchased (conditional on purchasing at least one food item). As
shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, we estimate that beverage calories per item fell by a trivial
amount (less than two calories per item). This is consistent with the absence of substitution
eﬀects for beverages in Table 2. Calories per food item, on the other hand, are estimated to
have fallen by 3.8% based on the transaction data and 15.2% calories based on the cardholder
data. The average food calories per purchased food item in the transaction data is 356 calories,
and 344 in the cardholder data, implying reductions of 14 calories and 52 calories, respectively.
31Calories are normalized in the ﬁgure to preserve product-level conﬁdentiality of the data.
32We use the number of items rather than the log of the number of items because most transactions have zero
food items.
33Both estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Due to conﬁdentiality we are unable to report the percent
reduction implied by these estimates.
13Hence, the ﬁndings in Table 4 reveal that calorie posting causes consumers to purchase fewer
food items and also to substitute to lower calorie food items.
Recall from Table 3 the estimated eﬀect of posting on food calories per transaction is a
14% reduction. The estimates in Table 4 show that this decline reﬂects a combination of fewer
food items per transaction and lower food calories per food item. Since average food calories
per transaction equals the average calories per food item times the number of food items per
transaction, we can quantify the relative importance of the two eﬀects. Our numbers imply that
26% of the reduction in food calories per transaction is due to reduced calories per item, and
74% is due to fewer food items per transaction.
Hence, nearly three quarters of the total calorie reduction can be attributed to people opting
not to buy food items. Figure 5 shows this main eﬀect graphically. In the top panel of the
ﬁgure we plot the right tail of the distribution of drink calories per transaction, before and after
calorie posting. The distributions are based on the transaction data for NYC only. There are
no controls (i.e. we do not utilize the data for the control cities, weather controls, and so forth).
To highlight the eﬀects of interest we show only the right tail of the distribution, from the Nth
percentile and above. To preserve conﬁdentiality (so as not to reveal the fraction of transactions
with a food item in the bottom panel) we are unable to state the exact value of N, only that
N ≥ 50. The ﬁgure is constructed by computing the Nth, (N + 1)th, ..., and 99th percentiles,
then plotting these points. The bottom panel of the ﬁgure is the analog for the distribution of
food calories.
Figure 5 reveals that the right tail of the distribution of drink calories per transaction is
barely diﬀerent before and after calorie posting. This further emphasizes the absence of any
signiﬁcant eﬀect from calorie posting on consumers’ beverage choices, even for relatively high-
calorie drink purchases. Looking at the bottom panel it is clear how calorie posting changes
the distribution of food calories per transaction: the fraction of transactions with zero food
food calories (no food item is purchased) increases by a few percent. However, conditional on
buying a food item, we see relatively small reductions in calories per transaction at nearly all
percentiles. The ﬁgure clariﬁes the main eﬀect of calorie posting in this data—average calories
fall mainly because people are less likely to buy a food item.
The analysis so far focuses on characteristics of consumers’ transactions, conditional on the
transactions taking place. Another potentially important eﬀect of calorie posting is that it may
cause individuals to transact less frequently. We examined this possibility using the cardholder
data, in which we observe the time path of transactions for each anonymous cardholder. We
14estimated negative binomial regressions of the number of transactions each week on individual
ﬁxed eﬀects, week dummies, weather controls, and the calorie posting dummy. The regressions
included the cardholders in Boston and Philadelphia as controls. We found no statistically
signiﬁcant change in the frequency of cardholders’ purchases in NYC relative to the control
cities; indeed, the point estimate of the coeﬃcient on calorie posting was very close to zero. We
conclude that while calorie posting clearly aﬀected consumers’ choices in the store, it had little
impact on how often they came to the store.
As noted in Section 2, the transaction data and cardholder data have no information about
milk that is added by consumers in the store. The milk order data provide aggregate information
about milk usage, based on daily milk replenishments at the store level. We looked for evidence
of changes in the level of milk usage, by type of milk (whole, 2% or skim), and changes in the
relative usage of diﬀerent kinds of milk.34 In all cases there was no statistically signiﬁcant impact
of calorie posting. This is consistent with the results reported above indicating that beverage
consumption was largely unaﬀected by calorie posting.
3.3 Heterogeneity in the Eﬀect of Mandatory Calorie Posting
While we have focused primarily on average outcomes, people presumably vary in their respon-
siveness to the calorie information. In Table 5 we present estimates of how the eﬀect of calorie
posting on calories per transaction diﬀers across sub-groups. The estimates in column (1) are
based on the transaction data. Although the anonymous transaction data contain no informa-
tion about the demographics of the consumers who made each transaction, we do know the store
location of each transaction, and census data provide us with zip-level demographics. Using this
information, we ﬁnd that the decrease in calories per transaction was larger in zips with higher
income and in zips with more education (i.e., more people with college degrees).
Columns (2)–(4) of Table 5 are based on the anonymous cardholder data. These data
actually include one demographic variable: the gender of each cardholder. We ﬁnd that female
cardholders were more responsive to posting than males.35 Based on their observed transactions
prior to calorie posting, we also assigned cardholders to groups based on whether their purchase
frequency was above or below the median frequency. As shown in column (3) of the table, we
ﬁnd that high frequency cardholders reduce calories per transaction by slightly less than low
34The milk order data includes Boston and Philadelphia, allowing us to control for the strong seasonal variation
in milk usage.
35The results in the ﬁrst column, based on the transaction data, suggest no meaningful diﬀerence between males
and females. However, the individual level data is surely more convincing in this case.
15frequency cardholders.
If the policy goal is to address obesity, the most relevant question may be whether calorie
posting disproportionately aﬀects consumers who make high-calorie purchases. For each card-
holder we compute their average calories per transaction in the period before posting, assigning
them to one of three categories: less than 125, between 125 and 250, or greater than 250. As
shown in column (4) of Table 5, we ﬁnd that calorie posting has an even greater inﬂuence on
cardholders who tended to make high-calorie purchases—for those who averaged more than 250
calories per transaction, calories per transaction fell by 26%.36 These eﬀects do not merely
reﬂect regression to the mean, because the inclusion of Boston and Philadelphia cardholders
accounts for this pattern.
While the above analysis isolates the eﬀect of calorie posting on the subset of individuals
who make high calorie transactions, an alternative view is that the policy should lower the
tendency of all consumers to make high calorie transactions. The former concerns the impact of
calorie posting on particular individuals, and the latter concerns the impact on particular kinds
of transactions. We can examine this latter eﬀect by estimating the eﬀect of calorie posting
at diﬀerent quantiles of the distribution of calories per transaction, based on the complete
transaction data.
The results are reported in Table 6. These estimates are based on regressions analogous to
those reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, but instead of calculating the average calories
per transaction at each store on each day, we instead calculate the nth quantile of calories per
transaction, and regress the log of that quantile on the calorie posting dummy plus controls.
The results indicate that calorie reductions tended to be larger in the top half of the distribution
than in the bottom. Of course it is not surprising that the 10th percentile did not move much,
since you cannot get much lower than 5 calories. Of greater interest is the ﬁnding that the
percent reduction in calories is fairly constant from the 75th through the 99th percentile: the
absolute decrease in calories is higher for higher quantiles, but the percent change is roughly
stable at around 5 to 6%.
36That is: 100 × (1 − exp(.147 − .444)).
164 Eﬀect of Mandatory Calorie Posting on Proﬁt
The primary goal of the calorie posting policy is to change consumer behavior. Even if it
succeeds in that goal, however, it is important to evaluate the costs associated with the policy.
These costs include the direct costs of changing menu boards.37 More importantly, the costs
include any impact of the policy on restaurants’ operating proﬁts. In this section we analyze the
impact of calorie posting on Starbucks revenue. Although we have no cost data and therefore
cannot measure proﬁt directly, we suspect revenue is highly correlated with proﬁt for this ﬁrm,
for reasons we explain below.
In the above analysis we ﬁnd that posting caused calories per transaction to fall by 6%.
There is reason to expect that this implies lower revenue, because prices and calories are pos-
itively correlated for Starbucks’ products.38 Nonetheless, we can directly assess the impact on
revenues based on the comprehensive transaction dataset. To do so, we regress daily store rev-
enue on the calorie posting dummy, store, week and day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects and the weather
controls—essentially the same as equation (1) with a diﬀerent dependent variable. As reported
in column (1) of Table 7, we ﬁnd that calorie posting has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
average daily store revenue.
An important competitor to Starbucks in NYC is Dunkin Donuts. We obtained the address
of every Dunkin Donuts in NYC, Boston and Philadelphia, and created the variable “Dunkin
Donuts nearby,” which equals one for Starbucks stores with a Dunkin Donuts within 100 me-
ters.39 By this deﬁnition, 37 of the 222 Starbucks locations in NYC have a Dunkin Donuts
nearby. In column (2) of Table 7 we report that Starbucks stores with a nearby Dunkin Donuts
experience an average increase in daily store revenue of 3.3%.
We can unpack the revenue eﬀect into two components: the eﬀect on the number of trans-
actions and the eﬀect on revenue per transaction. As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7,
daily store transactions increased because of posting by 1.4%, on average. For Starbucks with
a nearby Dunkin Donuts, we ﬁnd that transactions per day increased by 3.2%. Although not
shown in the table, we ﬁnd that revenue per transaction was lowered by 0.8% on average for all
Starbucks in NYC. Hence, revenue per transaction is slightly down, and transactions per day is
slightly up, leading to zero net impact of calorie posting on Starbuck’s revenues.
37Calorie posting may also cause higher legal costs for restaurants, as they are exposed to potential litigation
if the stated calories are incorrect. See Scharﬀ (2008).
38The correlation between price and calories for the 100 most popular beverages is .80, although for the top
100 food items price and calories are essentially uncorrelated (-.05). Across all products, the correlation is .48.
39The ﬁndings are robust to reasonable variations in the cutoﬀ distance.
17We interpret these results as evidence that calorie posting causes consumers to not only
substitute products within stores, but also to substitute across stores. Dunkin Donuts was also
required to post calories, and since donuts are very high in calories, this may have discouraged
consumers from patronizing Dunkin Donuts. Consumers who were routinely purchasing coﬀee
and donuts at Dunkin Donuts may have switched to buying coﬀee at Starbucks when confronted
with the calorie content of donuts. We see suggestive evidence of this when we look separately at
the impact of posting on beverage revenues vs. food revenues. Column (5) of Table 7 reports that
drink revenues increased by 1.1% for Starbucks not near a Dunkin Donuts, and for Starbucks
with a Dunkin Donuts nearby revenues increased by 5.0% (based on the estimates of 0.011 +
0.038). Column (6) shows that food revenues fell by 7.7% (based on the estimate of -0.074)
for Starbucks without a nearby Dunkin Donuts, but fell by only 5.5% for those with a nearby
Dunkin Donuts. Hence, not only did store revenue tend to increase for Starbucks located near
a Dunkin Donuts, but the increase stemmed entirely from improved beverage sales.
The results in the table describe the impact of calorie posting on revenues, but proﬁts are
ultimately the relevant measure. Even if revenue did not change at all, it is possible that proﬁts
declined: consumers’ purchases could have shifted toward products with the same prices but
smaller proﬁt margins. However, the data suggest that the opposite is true. After calorie
posting, the average price per item purchased increased in NYC relative to the control cities.
We suspect that Starbucks’ product-level proﬁt margins are positively correlated with prices, so
the increase in average price per item suggests that purchases may have shifted toward products
with higher proﬁt margins on average.
5 Discussion
To summarize brieﬂy, the analyses above show that mandatory calorie posting caused food
calories per transaction to fall by 14% on average, but had a negligible impact on beverage
calories per transaction. Three quarters of the reduction in food calories was due to consumers
being less likely to purchase a food item, and one quarter of the eﬀect was due to consumers
substituting towards lower calorie food items. The eﬀect is larger for individuals that tended
to make high-calorie purchases at Starbucks prior to calorie posting (we ﬁnd a 26% reduction).
There does not appear to have been any change in individuals’ transaction frequency. We also
ﬁnd that the impact of calorie posting on proﬁts depends on whether there is a nearby Dunkin
Donuts. Overall, however, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on Starbucks proﬁt.
18In this section we discuss a number of questions that naturally arise in light of these ﬁndings.
Why is there an eﬀect? Is the eﬀect big enough to matter? Does mandatory calorie posting
cause restaurants to oﬀer low calorie options? And why is government intervention required?
5.1 Why is there an eﬀect?
One reason why calorie posting may aﬀect consumer choice is a learning eﬀect: if consumers were
previously uninformed about the caloric content of the items, the information may alter their
purchase decisions.40 Since the information was already available at the Starbucks website, this
explanation presumes it is costly to learn about calories, with posting on menus reducing the
cost of learning. The nutrition information at the web site is in fact much more comprehensive
than the simple calorie count shown on menus; but prior research shows that individuals may
be inattentive when information is complex or opaque.41 Another possible explanation for the
observed reduction in calories per transaction is a salience eﬀect: consumers know the calories,
but only incorporate this into decision-making when reminded at the point of purchase.42 Of
course, behavior may be driven by a combination of learning and salience eﬀects.
To examine the plausibility of these explanations, we designed and implemented a survey
of Starbucks customers before and after calorie posting. We were not able to do this in NYC
because we began the study after the introduction of posting in NYC. However, we learned
in advance that Seattle would introduce calorie posting on January 1, 2009. An important
diﬀerence with the calorie posting requirement in NYC is that the pastry case was exempt in
Seattle. Hence, while beverages had calories posted on the menu boards, food items sold in
Starbucks in Seattle did not.43 On December 5, 2008 (prior to posting in Seattle) we performed
in-store customer surveys at two locations in Seattle and two locations in San Francisco, and
again on January 30, 2009 (after posting) in the same four locations. The inclusion of surveys in
San Francisco is useful to control for time trends. The actual two-page questionnaire is shown
in the appendix.
40Cai, Chen and Fang (2009) also study a particular form of learning (i.e. social learning) in a restaurant
context.
41The nutrition information at Starbucks web site includes calories, fat calories, total fat, saturated fat, trans
fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates, ﬁber, sugar, protein, vitamin A, vitamin B, vitamin C, calcium, iron
and caﬀeine. See Cowburn and Stockley (2005) for a survey of the literature on consumer understanding and use
of nutrition labeling on packaged foods. DellaVigna (2008) provides a review of the broader economic research
into the limited abilities of individuals to utilize available information in decision making.
42Salience eﬀects have been found to be important in the context of taxation: see Chetty, Looney and Kroft
(2008) and Finkelstein (2008).
43As noted in Section 3, regression analysis of the transaction data for Seattle (and controls) shows no signiﬁcant
impact of calorie posting on either food or beverage calories per transaction.
19All surveys were completed between the hours of 9am and 12pm. Consumers were ap-
proached after making a purchase and oﬀered a $5 Starbucks gift card to complete the survey.
Generally these were customers waiting for barista-made beverages (e.g. caﬀ` e latte). Hence, we
expect our sample under-represents consumers that ordered regular coﬀee (which is fulﬁlled im-
mediately), but this was consistent across locations, and before and after posting. Respondents
were positioned where they could not see the menu boards while answering the questions. We
obtained 792 completed surveys in total (an average of 99 responses per store per wave).
A key question in the survey tests consumers’ knowledge of the calories in the beverage they
just purchased. Figure 6 shows the distribution of errors—predicted minus actual calories—in
respondents’ best guess for their purchased beverage. There are three main points to take from
these ﬁgures. First, people tend to be very inaccurate. In the pre-posting data for Seattle,
we ﬁnd that consumers overestimate the calories in their purchased beverages by an average
of 86.4 calories, with 75.3% of respondents overestimating the calories in their beverage.44 In
San Francisco at the same time, consumers also overestimate the calories in their purchased
beverages, in this case by 94.2 calories, with 75.0% of respondents overestimating their bever-
age calories. Only 20.1% of respondents (pre-posting in Seattle) guessed the calories of their
purchased beverage to within plus or minus 50.
Although not shown in the ﬁgure, for purchased food the average error of respondents in
Seattle (San Francisco) in December was an underestimate of 20.2 (61.6) calories. And 76.2%
(76.9%) of respondents in Seattle (San Francisco) underestimate their purchased food calories.
We also tested consumers knowledge of the calories in some popular food and drink items
sold at Starbucks. Respondents overestimated the calories in a grande latte similarly to their
overestimating of their purchased beverages. Respondents underestimated the calories in a
blueberry muﬃn by 68.3 calories on average. As a reality check on the survey data, we also ﬁnd
that individuals who highly rate the importance of calories (one of the survey questions) do in
fact tend to be signiﬁcantly more accurate in their calorie estimates than those who rate calories
as unimportant. Overall, the survey responses do not support any notion that consumers were
generally well-informed about calories prior to calorie-posting.
Recall that we ﬁnd calorie posting has no major eﬀect on beverage choices, but signiﬁcantly
aﬀects food choices. The above survey results reinforce the point that expectations are im-
portant. Because consumers tend to overestimate calories in beverages, calorie posting does
not discourage people from purchasing their desired beverages. (On average, the information
44The results are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude all purchases of beverages with less than 10 calories
(such as brewed coﬀee and tea), for which it is impossible to underestimate by more than a few calories.
20comes as a pleasant surprise.) In contrast, consumers tend to underestimate food calories, so
the correction due to calorie posting leads them to reduce their food purchases.
A second point to take from the top panel of Figure 6 is that people become somewhat more
accurate in their knowledge of calories after calorie posting in Seattle. The average absolute
error in respondents’ predictions in the ﬁgure for Seattle falls from 136.4 to 102.4. But the third
point to take from Figure 6 is that accuracy also improves in San Francisco, where the average
absolute error falls from 141.9 to 124.2. Moreover, while the accuracy improvements in Seattle
were by some measures larger than those in San Francisco, the diﬀerences are not statistically
signiﬁcant. Thus, while it appears that consumers were more informed about calories after
posting, we cannot attribute this change to the posting itself. It is possible that we inadvertantly
sampled a more informed mix of consumers in the second survey wave. Alternatively, interest
in calories could be heightened in January because of new year resolutions to be healthier. In
fact there is a dramatic increase in internet search activity for the term “calories” on January 1
every year.45
In addition to testing calorie knowledge, the survey also evaluated people’s attitudes towards
calories. Did calorie posting in Seattle make people care more about calories? To avoid any
bias, the survey was designed so that neither calories nor nutrition was mentioned on the ﬁrst
page, and surveyors were instructed not to mention anything about calories or nutrition when
engaging respondents. The ﬁrst page asks the open-ended question: “What were the most
important factors in making your purchase decision?” Prior to posting, 6.3% of individuals in
Seattle included the words “calorie,” “health,” or “nutrition” in their response to this question.
Following posting, this number increased to 14.4%. In San Francisco the number also increased,
from 6.5% to 10.1%, possibly due to the new year resolution eﬀect mentioned above, again
highlighting the importance of the control sample. In this case, however, the change in Seattle
was statististically signiﬁcantly larger than the change in San Francisco, suggesting that calorie
posting does actually increase people’s attentiveness to calories.
We also asked consumers to rate the importance of taste, price, and calories on a scale of 1
(not important) to 7 (very important). The results, presented in Table 8, illustrate two main
points. First, there is a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the importance of calories in Seattle
following calorie posting, indicating that posting increases consumers’ sensitivity to calories.
Note also that the importance of taste and price is roughly constant over time in both cities,
and the importance of calories is constant in San Francisco. However, the second point to take
from this table is that calories are the least important factor in both cities, before and after
45http://www.google.com/trends?q=calories
21calorie posting in Seattle. While it may not be surprising that people who go to Starbucks do so
for the taste rather than the healthfulness of its oﬀerings, these results support the claim that
people are less concerned about calories than they are about taste and price when they consume
fast food—an argument that was put forward for why calorie posting would have no impact on
consumer choice at fast food restaurants. Overall, the survey evidence suggests calorie posting
causes a decrease in calories per transaction because of salience rather than learning.
We are able to further examine this hypothesis utilizing the cardholder data. Since we
observe the store locations of cardholders’ transactions, we can identify consumers who make
purchases at both calorie-posting and non-calorie-posting stores. Speciﬁcally, we observe a group
of 884 cardholders who visit NYC stores after calorie-posting, but who conducted at least 20%
(and no more than 80%) of their transactions in non-NYC (and thus non-calorie-posting) stores.
We call these cardholders “commuters” since most of them appear to be commuting into NYC
from neighboring suburbs like Westchester and Nassau Counties (NY), Fairﬁeld County (CT),
and Hudson County (NJ). Observing the commuters’ transactions allows us to ask the question:
after the introduction of calorie posting in NYC, do commuters also purchase fewer calories per
transaction when outside of NYC? If learning eﬀects are important (and commuters’ memories
are not too short), then we might expect these consumers to reduce their calories per transaction
everywhere (even outside of NYC) after being exposed to calorie information in NYC. If only the
salience eﬀect is important, we expect commuters would purchase more calories when visiting
Starbucks outside of NYC, since even though they have been exposed to calorie information in
NYC, outside of NYC there is no visible reminder of calorie content.
To test this hypothesis we use the cardholder data to estimate a speciﬁcation in which
the dependent variable is log calories per transaction, and the independent variables include
interactions of the post-01April08 dummy with various categories of purchase: non-commuters’
purchases in NYC, commuters’ purchases in NYC after April 1, commuters’ purchases outside of
NYC before April 1, and commuters’ purchases outside of NYC after April 1. The regression also
includes individual, week and day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects, holiday dummies and weather controls,
and transactions of Boston and Philadelphia cardholders are still included to help control for
seasonality. The results are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 9.
The estimates indicate that commuters reduced their calories per transaction in NYC stores
by roughly 7.7%, which is similar to the reduction for non-commuters in NYC (6.0%). We
estimate the eﬀect on commuters’ non-NYC transactions to be even larger (12.0% reduction).
However, this estimate is statistically imprecise, so we cannot rule out that the eﬀect is of equal
magnitude to the in-NYC eﬀect, and we can only rule out a zero eﬀect at the 10% signiﬁcance
22level. The second column of estimates in Table 9 reports a regression in which commuters’ post-
April, non-NYC transactions, are separated into two categories: those for which the individual
had versus had not previously visited a calorie-posting store in NYC. If the primary explanation
for the observed eﬀects is learning, we would not expect any change in non-NYC transactions
until after the individual has been exposed to calorie information in NYC. The point estimates
are consistent with this story: calorie reductions appear to occur at non-NYC stores only if the
cardholder has made prior visits to calorie-posting stores in NYC.
The survey evidence and the analysis of commuters’ purchase patterns provide mixed evi-
dence concerning the role of learning and salience in explaining the observed eﬀects of calorie
posting. On the one hand, the survey results show that consumers knowledge of calories did not
signiﬁcantly improve because of posting, but consumers do report greater sensitivity to calories
when making purchase decisions. These ﬁndings support the role of salience. On the other
hand, the commuters also reduce their calories per transaction even when purchasing in loca-
tions that do not post calorie information, and indeed do so only after visiting a store that does
post calories. These results support the role of learning. Hence, we ﬁnd evidence in support of
both learning and salience as part of the mechanism for why calorie posting causes consumers
to reduce calories per transaction.
5.2 Is the eﬀect big enough to matter?
Could a 6% decrease in average calories per transaction at Starbucks conceivably translate into
a non-trivial reduction in obesity? We can attempt a very crude calculation to shed light on this
question. Based on food intake surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, along
with census data regarding food expenditures at full-service restaurants, a reasonable estimate
is that 25% of the average Americans’ calorie consumption comes from chain restaurants.46 If
we further assume that calorie consumption were reduced by 6% at all chain restaurants, and
that this reduction is not oﬀset by increases at other meals, then it would imply a decrease in
total calorie consumption on the order of 1.5%. If average daily intake is around 2,000 calories,
the implied calorie reduction is 30 calories per day.47
46It is actually rather challenging to ﬁnd a direct estimate of the fraction of calories that come from chain
restaurants (or restaurants in general, for that matter). As best we can tell, the USDA food intake surveys were
last conducted in the mid-1990s, at which point they estimated that 32% of the average person’s calories were
consumed away from home. The same fraction was estimated to be 18% in the late 1970s. Given the trend,
it seems likely that the fraction is even higher today (see Stewart, Blisard and Jolliﬀe (2006) for a discussion).
Separate surveys from 2004 indicate that chain restaurants account for between 50 and 75% of meals away from
home (Keystone Center, 2006).
47The U.S. Department of Agriculture runs a survey of nutrient intake, and in the periods 2005–06 they report
the average caloric intake of males and females aged two and over was 2,157. Males aged 30–39 consume the most
23The relationship between calorie reduction and weight loss is complicated because of physi-
ological compensations that occur (such as changes in metabolism). Based on studies published
in the medical literature (for example, Redman et al, 2009), we could expect a permanent 1.5%
reduction in caloric intake to decrease long-run body weight by no more than 1%. In simpler
terms, common weight loss programs recommend reductions of 500 to 1,000 calories per day,
which are said to translate into weight loss of around one to two pounds per week. Hence, our
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that average reductions resulting from calorie posting
in chain restaurants will not by themselves have a major impact on obesity.
However, there are several reasons why this exercise may understate the potential impact of
calorie posting on obesity. First, looking at average eﬀects could be misleading in the context of
obesity. We showed above that the 90th percentile of the distribution of calories per transaction
is also lowered by around 5 to 6% because of calorie posting, and for individuals who averaged
more than 250 calories per transaction there is a 26% decrease in calories per transaction.
Moreover, it is plausible these customers consume signiﬁcantly more than 2,000 calories per day,
leading to a much bigger reduction than 30 calories per day.
A second reason why the above calculation may understate the impact on obesity is that the
eﬀects we estimate for Starbucks may understate the impact at other chain restaurants (Dunkin
Donuts being one likely example). Indeed, we ﬁnd that consumer choices with respect to food
is more sensitive to calorie posting (14% decrease in calories per transaction) than their choices
with respect to beverages. This may be speciﬁc to Starbucks. Alternatively, it suggests the
impact of calorie posting on calories per transaction at other chains may be signiﬁcantly higher
than at Starbucks.
Third, the long-run impact of calorie posting may be even greater if restaurants respond
by oﬀering more low-calorie items. If chains were to oﬀer tasty, low-price, low-calorie options,
then calorie posting may be signiﬁcantly more impactful. Conceivably, by raising awareness of
healthy eating, calorie posting may indeed cause chains to move in this direction. Of course all
three of these reasons are speculative, and indeed the true eﬀect may be even smaller than our
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests (e.g. consumers may oﬀset their calorie reductions at
Starbucks by increasing their intake from other sources).48
calories, with an average intake of 2,978 calories.
48In fact Anderson and Matsa (2008) ﬁnd evidence in support of this kind of oﬀsetting behavior.
245.3 Does mandatory calorie posting cause restaurants to oﬀer low calorie
options?
Given our ﬁnding that consumers are responsive to calorie posting, restaurants have an economic
incentive to oﬀer low calorie options. Although the proﬁtability of doing so also depends on the
costs of such items, it is conceivable that the most meaningful eﬀect of the calorie posting law
will be its long-run impact on the products restaurants choose to oﬀer.49 It would not be the ﬁrst
time that increasing the provision of information to consumers caused a supply-side response
from restaurants—Jin and Leslie (2003) show that mandatory restaurant hygiene grade cards
cause restaurants to improve hygiene quality. Moreover, calorie posting may be much more
eﬀective at reducing obesity if it leads to consumers being presented with a wider range of tasty
low calorie drink and food choices.
There are a few challenges to assessing the eﬀect of calorie posting on menu oﬀerings by
chain restaurants. First, we expect there is a pre-existing trend towards oﬀering low calorie
options. For example, McDonalds introduced salad oﬀerings in 2007, before calorie posting
commenced. Second, changes in product oﬀerings at chain restaurants tend to be implemented
over broader geographies, if not nationwide.50 Hence, even if chains face diﬀerent disclosure
regimes in diﬀerent cities, researchers are unlikely to observe variation in menu oﬀerings across
cities. Third, while the consumer response to posting is rapid, we expect menu changes to take
much longer. Chain restaurants have optimized their organizational designs around their product
oﬀerings, which are hard to change—especially given their large scale relative to stand-alone
restaurants. Adding new products is a major organizational change for these ﬁrms, so even if the
introduction of a new product was in fact driven by something like a calorie-posting law, the new
product may not actually appear in the stores until many months after the law’s implementation.
Detecting such gradual changes and isolating their causes is obviously a challenging task for
empiricists.
Nevertheless, to provide some indication of whether calorie posting has caused restaurants
to oﬀer more low calorie options we did a phone survey of 33 restaurant managers in NYC.51
We wanted to include restaurants that are posting the calorie information on their menus and
restaurants that are not. To help make these two groups of restaurants comparable, we targeted
49In addition to adding low calorie items from among the set of low calorie products that are currently available,
the supply-side response to calorie posting includes innovation to develop new tastier and/or lower cost low calorie
products.
50Examples of chains introducing low calorie products nationwide in 2008 include Vivanno beverages at Star-
bucks, low calorie egg-white breakfast sandwiches at Dunkin Donuts, and the reduction in calories of McDonald’s
large french fries from 570 to 500 calories.
51We also attempted to obtain menus from before and after the posting requirement but only obtained a handful.
25chains that have between 10 and 20 units nationwide since chains with fewer than 15 units are
not required to post. Managers were asked six questions, including: Do you currently display
calorie information on your menu? In approximately the last six months (since posting began, if
applicable), have you added any low-calorie options to your menu? In a typical year, how many
times do you add or remove items from your menu? Among restaurants that reported changing
menus at least once per year but no more than 52 times per year, we ﬁnd that the probability
of introducing a low-calorie option conditional on posting is .71, and conditional on not posting
is .45. Hence, the survey provides a preliminary indication that posting may stimulate some
restaurants to introduce low-calorie items.
5.4 Why is government intervention required?
An important question in relation to any form of mandatory disclosure is why do we need
government intervention? If consumers value the information (in this case caloric content),
then proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms may voluntarily provide it—there are market-driven incentives for
information revelation.52 In the present context, it is important to understand why restaurants,
and chain restaurants in particular, are not voluntarily putting calories on menus.53 Apparently
the market incentives are not suﬃciently powerful, and understanding why is important in order
to assess the need for government intervention.
One reason why restaurants do not voluntarily post calories may be that the costs of acquiring
calorie information and changing menus exceed the (private) beneﬁts. There are two ways to
measure the calories in a meal: a look-up table of calories for each ingredient, which is cheap
but inaccurate; or scientiﬁc testing, which is expensive (in the vicinity of $1,000 per meal) and
accurate. Regardless, most chains, and especially the larger ones, already know the calorie
content of their meals and make this information available via web sites and brochures. The
cost of changing menu boards is around $1,000 to $2,000 per store, which is small in comparison
to store revenues (in the Starbucks data at least) and is a one-time cost. Hence, while there
are costs to posting, this does not seem a compelling explanation for why chains would not
voluntarily post calorie information. Given that the costs are relatively low, we might expect
the beneﬁts to exceed the costs for at least some relatively healthy restaurants.
52See Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). Reputations may be another market-based solution for the absence
of information (see, for example, Jin and Leslie, 2009). In this case, restaurants may obtain a reputation for
providing nutritious/healthy meals. See Dranove and Jin (2010) for a survey of the disclosure literature.
53The same was true of nutrition labeling of packaged foods before it became mandatory in the 1990s. See
Ippolito and Pappalardo (2002) and Mojduszka and Caswell (2000).
26A second possible explanation is the absence of a nutrition standard. Caloric content is not
the only measure of nutrition and may not even be the most important. Nutrition labeling
on packaged food, for example, contains much more detailed information than calories alone
(which may undermine its eﬀectiveness). In the absence of a standard, it is conceivable that one
restaurant (or one chain) would post total calories and another would post calories from fat, say.
Each restaurant would favor the measure that puts their meals in the best light, and consumers
would realize this and pay less attention. Viewed in this way, one of the most powerful aspects of
the NYC calorie posting law may be that it sets a standard and removes restaurants’ discretion
over what information to provide. Of course, this logic suggests an alternative policy that gives
restaurants the choice of whether to post, but if they do so it must be total calories.54
A related issue is that restaurants oﬀer many products that vary in nutritional value and
caloric content. This is a factor because the Grossman (1981) model of information unravelling
assumes ﬁrms are quality diﬀerentiated—the highest quality ﬁrm wants to credibly reveal its
quality. However, in a setting where ﬁrms are not quality diﬀerentiated the incentives for vol-
untary disclosure are less clear. The unravelling argument may not apply if ﬁrms’ “healthiness”
cannot be clearly ranked.
A third explanation is that calorie posting lowers demand for restaurants. This could be
because consumers are surprised by how many calories are in the meals (learning eﬀect), because
they are not surprised but are now more sensitive to the information (salience eﬀect), or because
consumers would rather not know how many calories are in their meals (like not wanting to know
what exactly is in a sausage). Evidence exists concerning some of these possibilities. Bassett
et al (2008) provide survey evidence that consumers overwhelmingly would like to know calorie
information for restaurant meals. Our study indicates that demand at Starbucks is aﬀected,
there is both learning and salience eﬀects at play, but that proﬁts are not negatively impacted.
The sandwich chain Subway is an interesting example of a restaurant that voluntarily posted
calories on menu boards several years before it was required (and does so nationwide). Presuming
it is proﬁtable for Subway to do so, the question arises: why would it be proﬁtable for Subway
but not other chains? The answer must be that calorie posting increases demand for some
restaurants and lowers it for others. Indeed, our revenue analysis indicates the calorie posting
law in NYC shifted demand away from Dunkin Donuts towards Starbucks (in situations where
they are located near each other).
54There may also be a perverse eﬀect of making calories the standard: restaurants may make their food less
nutritious in other respects (e.g. ﬁber content) in order to minimize calories. Indeed, prior research has shown
that information has the potential to be harmful (e.g. Dranove, et al, 2003).
276 Conclusion
Nutrition labeling on packaged food has been mandatory in the U.S. since the early 1990s,
and has become an accepted practice—it is hard to imagine there would be much support for
removing these labels at this stage. But the fraction of calories consumed in restaurants has
been trending upward, and mandatory posting of calories on restaurant menus is a new policy
that extends nutrition labeling beyond packaged food for the ﬁrst time.55 Many jurisdictions
are following the lead of NYC, and the federal government is considering a national requirement
as part of the major health reforms currently before congress (as at November, 2009). However,
since nutritional information is already generally available to interested consumers, it is not
obvious that such laws would have a meaningful impact on their behavior. In this study we
examine comprehensive transaction data from Starbucks to determine whether calorie posting
has the desired eﬀect. With annual revenues around $10 billion, the sheer size of Starbucks
makes it an important testing ground.
We ﬁnd that mandatory calorie posting causes average calories per transaction to fall by
6% at Starbucks. The eﬀect is long lasting. The eﬀect is almost entirely related to changes in
consumers’ food choices—there is almost no change in purchases of beverage calories (Starbucks’
core business). The eﬀect is larger for high-calorie consumers. Learning appears to play an
important role in explaining consumers’ responses: our surveys show that consumers tend to be
quite ignorant about calories, and the purchase data show that consumers exposed to calorie
information in NYC stores reduce their calorie consumption even at non-calorie-posting stores.
Survey respondents reported an increase in sensitivity to calories, suggesting that salience also
plays a role. The impact on Starbucks proﬁt is negligible on average, and for the subset of stores
located close to their competitor Dunkin Donuts, the impact of calorie posting is actually to
increase Starbucks revenue. To reiterate, these ﬁndings relate to a policy change in which all
chain restaurants are required to post calories on menus. The eﬀects of voluntary posting by an
individual chain would likely be very diﬀerent.
Ultimately, mandatory calorie posting is only a good policy if the beneﬁts outweigh the
costs. Based on our back-of-the-envelope calculation in Section 5.2, the direct eﬀect of calorie
posting on obesity may be small. Calorie reductions on the order of 6% at chain restaurants
would yield only modest decreases in body weight, even if those reductions were not oﬀset by
increased caloric intake at other meals. However, as far as regulatory policies go, the costs of
calorie posting are very low—so even these small beneﬁts could outweigh the costs. Moreover,
55Lin, Guthrie and Frazao (1999) examine the trend in eating away from home.
28the long-run eﬀects of calorie posting are potentially more dramatic. At the margin, calorie
posting should encourage restaurants to innovate and oﬀer low-calorie items. We document
some preliminary evidence that this is happening in NYC. Also, there may be public education
beneﬁts from the policy: consumers’ exposure to calorie information may make them generally
more aware and attentive to the nutritional value of the foods they eat.
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34Table 2: Changes in individuals’ beverage choices following mandatory calorie posting
Smaller size Same size Larger size Total
Lower calories per ounce 2.26 7.08 2.27 11.61
1.87 9.44 1.76 13.06
Same calories per ounce 4.51 67.57 4.12 76.20
4.39 66.74 3.95 75.08
Higher calories per ounce 1.59 6.54 4.05 12.19
1.54 6.92 3.40 11.86
Total 8.36 81.20 10.45 100.00
7.79 83.20 9.11 100.00
Entries are based on each individuals most common beverage choice before versus after calorie posting in NYC.
The top entry in each cell is relates to individuals in NYC and the bottom entry in each cell relates to individuals
in Boston and Philadelphia. For example, 2.00% of individuals in NYC changed their beverage choice (following
calorie posting) to a beverage that has lower calories per ounce and also a smaller size. The same number for
Boston and Phildelphia is 1.86%.
35Table 3: Estimates of the eﬀect of mandatory calorie posting on
log(calories per transaction)
Transaction data Cardholder data
log(beverage calories) -0.003 0.008
(0.001) (0.005)
log(food calories) -0.147 -0.119
(0.002) (0.008)
log(beverages + food) -0.060 -0.051
(0.001) (0.005)
Number of observations 118,480 1,511,516
Each reported coeﬃcient estimate is obtained from a separate regression. The rows represent diﬀerent depen-
dent variables and the columns correspond to the transaction data and the cardholder data, respectively. An
observation in the transaction data regressions is a store-day combination. An observation in the cardholder data
regressions is a cardholder transaction. We exclude transactions that do not include at least one beverage or food
item. All regressions includes week ﬁxed eﬀects, weather controls (temperature, temperature-squared, precipita-
tion and precipitation-squared). Additionally, regressions using the transaction data include store ﬁxed eﬀects,
and regressions using the cardholder data include individual ﬁxed eﬀects. In the ﬁrst column the R
2 ranges from
.73 to .85 and the in the second column the R
2 ranges from .27 to .64.
36Table 4: Estimates of the eﬀect of calorie posting on items per transaction and
calories per single beverage or single food item transaction
Items per transaction
Transaction data Cardholder data
Number of beverages 0.005 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Number of food items -0.029 -0.021
(0.001) (0.002)
Beverages + food items -0.027 -0.017
(0.003) (0.003)
Calories per item purchased
Transaction data Cardholder data
log(beverage calories -0.008 0.004
per beverage) (0.001) (0.004)
log(food calories -0.039 -0.165
per food item) (0.001) (0.014)
Each reported coeﬃcient estimate in this table is obtained from a separate regression. All speciﬁcations include
the same controls as in Table 3. In the top panel (items per transaction) we utilize 118,480 store-day combinations
for the regressions in the transaction data column, and we obtain R
2’s ranging from .27 to .82.The regressions
using the cardholder data in the top panel are based on 1,511,516 observations, and the R
2 vary between .26 and
.37. In the bottom panel, examining log(calories per item purchased), we condition the sample on transactions
with at least one beverage (second to bottom row) or at least one food item (bottom row). In the transaction data
column an observation is a store-day combination, and the number of observations is 118,480 in both cases (R
2’s
are .83 and .64, respectively). In the cardholder data column in the bottom panel there are 1,486,839 observations
of transactions with at least one beverage and 233,575 observations of transactions with at least one food item.
The R
2 in these regressions are .70 and .33, respectively.
37Table 5: Heterogeneity in the impact of calorie posting
on log(calories per transaction)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posting -0.102 -0.032 -0.058 0.147
(0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Posting × median income (in $100,000) -0.012
(0.006)
Posting × percent with college degree -0.020
(0.010)
Posting × percent aged 20–45 0.001
(0.001)
Posting × percent female -0.001 -0.049
(0.001) (0.006)
Posting × high frequency customer 0.011
(0.007)
Posting × medium calorie customer -0.298
(0.008)
Posting × high calorie customer -0.444
(0.007)
Number of observations 94,997 1,511,516 1,511,516 1,511,516
R2 0.81 0.56 0.56 0.56
Transaction data Yes No No No
Cardholder data No Yes Yes Yes
Each column is a separate regression. In all cases the dependent variable is log(calories per transaction). Re-
gressions based on the transaction data also include store ﬁxed eﬀects, week and day of week dummies, and
weather controls. Regressions based on the cardholder data also include individual ﬁxed eﬀects, week dummies
and weather controls. In the last column, “medium calorie” customers are deﬁned as customers for whom average
calories per transaction in the pre-calorie-posting period was between 125-250. “High calorie” customers had
average calories per transaction above 250.
38Table 6: Estimated eﬀects of mandatory calorie posting at various quantiles
Calories per Estimated Implied change
Quantile transaction coeﬃcient in calories
10th 5 -0.002 -0.01
(0.001)
25th 23 -0.113 -2.47
(0.010)
50th 184 -0.007 -1.28
(0.002)
75th 380 -0.062 -22.83
(0.001)
90th 595 -0.053 -30.71
(0.001)
95th 766 -0.052 -38.81
(0.001)
99th 1208 -0.066 -77.16
(0.002)
Regressions using the log of the quantile as the dependent variable, with an observation being a store/day. That
is, we calculate the n
th quantile of calories per transaction at each store on each day, and regress the log of this
number on the calorie-posting dummy plus controls. The table reports only the coeﬃcient on the calorie-posting
dummy, but each regression includes store and week ﬁxed eﬀects, day-of-week dummies, holiday dummies and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 8: Importance of diﬀerent factors in purchase decisions
Seattle San Francisco
Taste Price Calories Taste Price Calories
December 5, 2008 6.4 4.6 3.5 6.4 4.5 4.2
January 30, 2009 6.5 4.7 4.2 6.2 4.3 4.2
Survey respondents rated the importance of each factor on a scale of 1 (not important) to 7 (very important).
The table reports average ratings. Calorie posting was implemented in Seattle on January 1, 2009. There is no
calorie posting in San Francisco. The diﬀerence between before and after average ratings of calories in Seattle is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with 99% conﬁdence. None of the other columns have statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
41Table 9: Eﬀects of calorie posting on commuters’ log(calories per transaction)
(1) (2)
Non-commuters:
NYC store after 01April08 -0.060 -0.060
(0.006) (0.006)
Commuters:
NYC store after 01April08 -0.077 -0.077
(0.011) (0.011)
Non-NYC store after 01April08 -0.120
(0.067)
No prior visits to posting stores -0.015
(0.116)
One or more visits to posting stores -0.124
(0.068)
Non-NYC store before 01April08 0.238 0.238
(0.061) (0.061)
Number of observations 1,470,095 1,470,095
R2 0.56 0.56
The regressions are based on the cardholder data, and include individual, week, and day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects, and
weather controls. An observation is a transaction, and the dependent variable is log(calories+1). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Commuters are deﬁned as cardholders whose visits to NYC stores comprised between 20%
and 80% of their total visits.
42Figure 1: Example of Starbucks’ menu board with calorie information
 
43Figure 2: Calories per transaction
 
44Figure 3: Regression estimates for weekly eﬀects of calorie posting
on log(calories per transaction)
We plot estimated week eﬀects for NYC based on a regression of log(calories per transaction) on NYC week
dummies, day-of-week eﬀects, and a full set of weather controls. Data from Boston and Phildelphia is included
in the regression. Hence, NYC week dummies are relative to these control cities.
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For each of the 60 most popular menu items we separately ran regressions of log daily sales on an indicator for
calorie posting, plus store, week, and day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects, holiday dummies and weather controls. Transac-
tions for the control cities were included to control for seasonal variation in product demand. In the ﬁgure we
plot each coeﬃcient on the calorie posting variable, against the normalized calories of the menu item. Calories
are normalized in the ﬁgure to preserve product-level conﬁdentiality of the data.
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To preserve conﬁdentiality of the data we are unable to specify the exact value of N, only that N≥50.
47Figure 6: Non-parametric distributions of errors in respondents’ estimates of
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Error in calorie estimate
Before calorie posting After calorie posting
San Francisco
Based on respondents estimate of the calories in the beverage just purchased. Responses are pooled across the
two locations in each city. There is no calorie posting in San Francisco—“after calorie posting” in the bottom
ﬁgure refers to the survey results from January 2009 in San Francisco.
48Appendix: Survey form for Starbucks customers (page 1 of 2)
AͲ1    STANFORDUNIVERSITYRESEARCHSURVEY
(continued on other side) 
How many times per week do you typically come to Starbucks? ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
Please tell us which beverage you just purchased for yourself (if any). 
Beverage Type  Size  Milk / extras  Other Info 
Ŷ Ŷ Regular coffee 
Ŷ Ŷ Decaf coffee 
Ŷ Ŷ Americano 
Ŷ Ŷ Tea 
Ŷ Ŷ Espresso 
Ŷ Ŷ Latte 
Ŷ Ŷ Mocha 
Ŷ Ŷ Chai tea 
Ŷ Ŷ Cappuccino 
Ŷ Ŷ Frappuccino 
Ŷ Ŷ Juice 
Ŷ Ŷ Hot Chocolate 
Ŷ Ŷ Other: 
Ŷ Ŷ Venti 
Ŷ Ŷ Grande 
Ŷ Ŷ Tall 
Ŷ Ŷ Short 
Ŷ Ŷ Doppio 
   (double shot)   
Ŷ Ŷ Solo
   (single shot)  
Ŷ Ŷ  Nonfat
Ŷ Ŷ  2% 
Ŷ Ŷ  Whole 
Ŷ Ŷ  Half-and-half 
Ŷ Ŷ  Soy 
Ŷ Ŷ  None 
Ŷ Ŷ  Don’t know 
Ŷ Ŷ hot        Ŷ Ŷ cold 
Whipped Cream: Ŷ Ŷ yes       Ŷ Ŷ no 
Flavored: Ŷ Ŷ yes Ŷ Ŷ no 
Flavor:
Please tell us which food item you purchased for yourself (if any). 
Food Type  Other Info 
Ŷ Ŷ Muffin 
Ŷ Ŷ Bagel 
Ŷ Ŷ Scone 
Ŷ Ŷ Cookie 
Ŷ Ŷ Croissant 
Ŷ Ŷ Bread 
Ŷ Ŷ Roll 
Ŷ Ŷ Doughnut 
Ŷ Ŷ Sandwich 
Ŷ Ŷ Cake 
Ŷ Ŷ Rice Crisp. Tr. 
Ŷ Ŷ Bar 
Ŷ Ŷ Brownie 
Ŷ Ŷ Tart/Danish 
Ŷ Ŷ Cinnamon Roll 
Ŷ Ŷ Bear Claw 
Flavor (e.g., blueberry): 
              
Ŷ Ŷ Other:
What were the most important factors in making your purchase decision? 







49Appendix: Survey form for Starbucks customers (page 2 of 2)
How many calories do you consume in a typical day?  (If unsure, make your best guess)   ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
How many calories would your doctor recommend you consume per day?  (best guess)    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
          Have you ever looked up Starbucks calorie information online or in print?  (yes or no)    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
What price did you pay for the item(s) you ordered?  If you can’t remember, just write your best guess.
        Beverage, if applicable ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ     Food item, if applicable    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
How many calories are in the item(s) you ordered?  If you don’t know, make your best guess.
        Beverage, if applicable ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ     Food item, if applicable    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
Please estimate the calories contained in the following items.  If you don’t know, make your best guess.
                        Grande (medium) Caramel Frappuccino with whipped cream    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
                                                                             Grande (medium) Caffé Latte with 2% milk    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
                                                                                                       Starbucks Blueberry Muffin ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
                                                                                 Starbucks Chocolate Chunk Cookie    ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
Medium-size banana ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
Can of regular Coca-Cola ŰŰŰŰŰŰŰ
              Do you typically read nutritional labels when grocery shopping?      Ŷ Ŷ yes          Ŷ Ŷ no      
Would you like to see calorie information on the Starbucks menu board?      Ŷ Ŷ yes          Ŷ Ŷ no        Ŷ Ŷ don’t care 
If calorie information were posted on the Starbucks menu board, how much would it affect your purchases? 
(not at all) Ŷ Ŷ 1 Ŷ Ŷ 2       Ŷ Ŷ 3       Ŷ Ŷ 4 4 Ŷ Ŷ 5 5 Ŷ Ŷ 6       Ŷ Ŷ 7 (a lot)
Gender: Ŷ Ŷ  Female Ŷ Ŷ  Male            Age: ŰŰŰŰŰ Height: ŰŰŰŰŰ    Weight: ŰŰŰŰŰ
Education: Ŷ Ŷ  Have not completed High School     Ŷ Ŷ  High School Ŷ Ŷ  Bachelors    Ŷ Ŷ  Graduate degree
How important were the following factors when you decided which item(s) to purchase? 
 Taste   (not important) Ŷ Ŷ 1 Ŷ Ŷ 2 Ŷ Ŷ 3       Ŷ Ŷ 4 4 Ŷ Ŷ 5 5 Ŷ Ŷ 6       Ŷ Ŷ 7 (very important)
 Price   (not important) Ŷ Ŷ 1 Ŷ Ŷ 2 Ŷ Ŷ 3       Ŷ Ŷ 4 4 Ŷ Ŷ 5 5 Ŷ Ŷ 6       Ŷ Ŷ 7 (very important)
 Calories  (not important) Ŷ Ŷ 1 Ŷ Ŷ 2 Ŷ Ŷ 3       Ŷ Ŷ 4 4 Ŷ Ŷ 5 5 Ŷ Ŷ 6       Ŷ Ŷ 7 (very important)
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